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Human history has been punctuated 
by widespread and recurring violent 
conflicts. Attempts to explain the 
causes, utility and effects of the phe- 
nomenon have engaged the minds of 
scholars and other stakeholders for 
centuries. At the centre of the inquiry 
are questions about human nature: 
whether and to what extent violence is 
innately determined in humans or in- 
fluenced by the external environment. 
According to ethnology, aggression 
or violence is innate and essentially 
genetic, not learned or a response to 
environmental conditions. The role of 
the environment, K. Lorenz posits, is 
simply to provide stimuli that trigger 
or hinder intraspecific aggression. This 
view, which modifies and restates the 
Social Darwinian theory of natural se- 
lection, maintains that aggression is 
not dysfunctional. Rather, it serves a 
number of important functions: the 
preservation of species through natu- 
ral selection; the creation of social 
ranks which imposes social order and 
stability, thus reducing intraspecific 
damage; defense of territory; protec- 
tion of mate, siblings and community; 
and the distribution of members over redirected. Viewing aggressive sport, 
available habitat. What makes aggres- it is asserted, provides such an outlet.' 
sion dangerous, however, is the spon- However, this hydraulic model- 
taneity of instinct. Thus, Lorenz which envisages a bottled up flow of 
concludes that it is important to pro- aggression constantly seeking expres- 
vide channels into which aggressive sion and overflowing into violence- 
instinct can be beneficially diverted or has been severely challenged because 
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of its questionable validity to both humans 
and non-humans, the inadequacy of data 
and logic, and the failure to consider 
structural factors and semi-autonomous 
psychological causes.2 The findings of 
increased aggressiveness among some 
people after viewing violent films or sports 
is also a direct refutation of the instinctive 
theory of aggression. The contention that 
aggression is innate and that humans are 
inevitably disposed to violence does not 
only present a false image of humans, it 
also makes violence a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Equally, it makes conflict 
resolution practically impossible. The 
intellectual weaknesses of the theory, and 
the potential effects of endorsing the ex-
planation, compelled a group of 20 leading 
scientists to repudiate it in Seville, Spain, 
in May 1986.3 
Imitation and social learning have been 
advanced as an alternative explanation of 
causes of violence. According to one of the 
leading proponents of this view, A. 
Bandura, aggression or violence is largely 
learned by observation through modeling.4 
"By observing others," he insists, "one 
forms rules of behaviour, and on future 
occasions this coded information serves as 
a guide for action."s He then suggests that, 
"modeling influences can serve as 
instructors, inhibitors, disinhibitors, 
facilitators, stimulus enhancers, and 
emotional arousers ... When novel modeled 
conduct is punished, observers are likely to 
learn the conduct that was punished as well 
as the restrains. "6 One who is rewarded 
for violence, therefore, will influence 
others to do the same; conversely, one who 
losses out for a similar act will deter 
others. 
In his review of the behavioural-ori-
ented social learning theory of aggres 
sion, K. Bjorkqvist suggests that learning 
aggression from models require, at 
minimum, four factors: "I) the degree of 
similarity between the model situation and 
the actual situation, 2) 
the degree of identification between actor 
and model, 3) the success of failure of the 
model (vicarious conditioning) , and 4) the 
amount of exposure to 
the model situation."7 It should be added 
that, while the theory correctly indicates 
that peace and violence can be learned, it 
neglects some important biological traits, 
and socioeconomic and political factors 
that influence human behaviour.8 
Another explanation that has been 
advanced to examine violence is the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis. Ac-
cording to the hypothesis, frustration-which 
provokes anger, that in turn, triggers 
aggression-is the most important source of 
violence. Simply put, there is a direct and 
necessary link between violence and 
frustration. A number of intervening 
variables are then suggested: the number of 
frustrations in the past; the norms 
concerning aggressive behaviour; and the 
resources available to potential object of 
aggression to punish or retaliate against the 
aggressor.9 
The utility of the hypothesis, however, 
is undermined by the fact that people may 
be aggressive not as a result of frustration, 
but in response to other factors. 
Furthermore, frustration, including that 
which results from unjust deprivation or 
inhibited goals, does not necessarily lead to 
aggression. For example, some people who 
are frustrated may become depressed, or 
may seek non-aggressive means to resolve 
their frustration. Simply, the hypothesis 
forgets that there are multiple causes of 
aggression and multiple effects of 
frustration.lO 
Factors and conditions that make 
societies prone to violence include: 
illegitimate and despotic regimes; 
illegitimate, despotic, corrupt and un 
accountable states and institutions; ethnic, 
racial, religious, gender, cultural and 
economic discriminations; scarcity of 
resources such as arable land and water; 
manipulation and politicization of 
differences, grievances and conflict; 
frustrated and unmet expectations; 
widespread and severe unemployment and 
poverty; pervasive culture of violence; 
erosion of societal cultures and systems of 
conflict resolution; power politics; 
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availability of weapons and ammuni- 
tion.ll 
Some of these factors and conditions 
have led to wars, massive denials of 
human rights, genocide and large- 
scale internal displacement and influx 
of refugees. In Africa, for example, vio- 
lent conflicts have ravaged many 
countries. In Algeria, the violence that 
resulted from the cancellation of 
multiparty general elections at the be- 
ginning of 1992, has claimed between 
60,000 and 70,000 lives. In Angola, the 
horrors of the war that began in 1975 
left approximately 1.5 million people 
dead, and 15 million land mines in the 
countryside. In Liberia, the civil war 
that broke out in 1989 lead to an esti- 
mated 150,000 deaths. In Somalia, the 
war and famines have claimed be- 
tween 400,OO and 500,000 lives since 
the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime 
in January 1991. In Rwanda, an esti- 
mated 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, 
most of them Tutsi, were massacred 
during the genocide in 1994. Approxi- 
mately 200,000 Hutu refugees per- 
ished in the present day Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In Sudan, approxi- 
mately 1.5 million people have died 
directly as a result of the civil war and 
famines since 1983. An estimated 
300,000 people have been killed in the 
on-going war between the govern- 
ment and rebels in Acholi, Uganda, 
since 1987.12 
In Asia, the situation is not mark- 
edly different. In Afghanistan, for ex- 
ample, the protracted war that 
followed the withdrawal of USSR 
troops and the overthrow of the Com- 
munist regime in April 1992, did not 
only led to the increased involvement 
of India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and 
Uzbekistan in the war, but also 
claimed thousands of lives, and left an 
estimated 10 million land mines in the 
countryside. In Cambodia, the over- 
throw of the Pol Pot regime (Khmer 
Rouge) in late 1978-which regime 
had destroyed between 1,000,000- 
3,000,000 lives-led to more deaths 
and displacement. The war also left 
behind an estimated 10 million land 
mines in the countryside. The violent 
occupation of the former Portuguese 
colony of East Timor by Indonesia 
since December 1975, has claimed the 
lives of approximately 200,000 
Timorese. In Sri Lanka, the war be- 
tween the government and the Libera- 
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has 
claimed over 32,000 lives since 1983. In 
Tajikistan, the war that broke after the 
declaration of independence in Au- 
gust 1991, is estimated to have killed 
between 50,000 and 200,000 people.13 
In Europe, violent conflicts have 
also ravaged some countries. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, for example, more 
than 100,000 people were killed in the 
war that followed the resolution of fed- 
eral Yugoslavia. The war or ethnic 
cleansing ended immediately after the 
Dayton (Paris) accord was signed in 
November 1995, and a NATO-led mul- 
tinational force (IFOR) launched Op- 
eration Joint Endeavor to replace the 
United Nations humanitarian opera- 
tion. The war left an estimated 3 mil- 
lion land mines in the countryside. In 
Croatia, the civil war that broke out in 
1991 caused the deaths of more than 
10,000 people. In Russia (Chechnya), 
the violent conflict that followed 
Chechnya's abortive declaration of in- 
dependence, caused the deaths of an 
estimated 40,000 people.14 
These examples indicate that the 
cost of violent conflicts, measured in 
terms of deaths, is a major calamity of 
the closing decades of this century. 
Injuries caused by wars and land 
mines escalate the costs. To these bur- 
dens must be added the trauma that 
the survivors suffer; large-scale inter- 
nal displacement and refugee migra- 
tions that result from such conflicts; 
profound economic consequences, in- 
cluding insecurity which discourages 
investments, loss of human resources, 
increased corruption, disruptions of 
agriculture, transportation and indus- 
try; severe damage to cultures and in- 
stitutions which could settle conflicts 
and provide stability; and the promo- 
tion of the culture of violence, repres- 
sion and discrimination. 
Given the patterns, magnitude and 
effects of violent conflicts, averypress- 
ing need exists for prevention, man- 
agement and resolution of conflicts. 
How conflicts are defined, what strat- 
egies and methods are adopted at a 
particular point, the objectives of inter- 
vention and the cultural, socioeco- 
nomic and political history of the 
society, will have sigruficant effects on 
both the outcome and future relations. 
Often, each specific conflict is inter- 
locked with other conflicts. Hence, 
changes in other conflicts may affect 
both the direction and tempo of the 
specific conflict that is the focus of at- 
tention. 
Preventing conflicts before they de- 
velop into violence is the most desir- 
able and least costly method of conflict 
resolution. It requires effective and 
comprehensive early warning sys- 
tems. Such systems must be based on 
factual analyses of the socioeconomic, 
cultural and political history of the so- 
ciety, and rigorous and balanced ex- 
amination of the underlying causes, 
nature and phase of the conflict. Early 
warnings, in turn, require assertive 
leadership and commitment to early 
actions that will alleviate pressures, or 
risk factors; and comprehensive efforts 
to resolve underlying and/or struc- 
tural root causes of violence.15 
Once violent conflicts have erupted, 
preventative action should focus on 
"creating political, economic, and, if 
necessary, military barriers to limit the 
spread of conflict within and between 
states. Firebreaks may be created 
through well-designed assertive ef- 
forts to deny belligerents the ability to 
resupply arms, ammunition, and hard 
currency, combined with humanitar- 
ian operations that provide relief for 
innocent people."16 
Negotiation is also a necessary 
method of conflict resolution. Here, 
conditions that make the protagonists 
recognize the humanity of each other, 
and that a mutually acceptable settle- 
ment is possible and necessary, should 
be created. Such confidence-building 
strategy requires mediators who are 
perceived as fair and just by the parties 
to the conflict. This perception is im- 
portant if a high-quality and durable 
settlement is to be reached. The media- 
tors should also possess good under- 
standing of the conflict and its 
-- - - 
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underlying causes, the parties and the 
society. Depending on the nature, 
phase and goals of conflict and conflict 
resolution, the roles of the intermedi- 
aries may include: encouraging com- 
munication; providing appropriate 
settings for negotiations; developing 
options; offering compensations and 
rewards that facilitate reachingnegoti- 
ated settlements; increasing costs of 
not reaching negotiated settlements; 
offering appropriate conflict resolu- 
tion methods; controlling information; 
and setting time limits. 
Generally, mediators fall into two 
broad categories: non-official and offi- 
cial. The former, called variously, 
Track Two, people-to-people, citizen, 
or supplementary diplomacy, increas- 
ingly offers important channels of 
communication and creates options 
for negotiated settlements. These are 
often done by organizing conferences 
and providing other forums for unoffi- 
cial dialogue involving members and/ 
or supporters of the parties in conflict. 
Such activities may also influence for- 
mal decision-making process, that is 
Track One Diplomacy. National and 
international non-governmental or- 
ganizations are among the major 
players in Track Two diplomacy. For 
example, The World Council of 
Churches (WCC) and the All Africa 
Conference of Churches (AACC) were 
principal mediators in the 1972 Addis 
Ababa agreement that temporarily 
ended the war in Sudan. Saint Egidio 
and churches in Mozambique we& 
important actors in Mozambique 
peace negotiations. In Uganda, the 
churches continue to exert pressure on 
both the government and armed oppo- 
sition groups for a comprehensive ne- 
gotiated settlement to the war in the 
north and west of the country. The In- 
ternational Peace Academy, the Carter 
Center's International Negotiation 
Network, the Institute for Multi-Track 
Diplomacy, and the International 
Alert, among other NGOs, have also 
been instrumental in mediation ef- 
forts." 
Official mediators are representa- 
tives of states, regional and interna- 
tional organizations, and pursue Track 
One diplomacy. Often, they bring 
more incentives, resources and muscle 
and higher prestige to mediation than 
unofficial mediators. For example, 
powerful and industrialized states are 
capable of engaging in "power media- 
tion" by using coercion or leverage in 
the form of incentives, compensation 
or threatened punishments to drive the 
parties towards a negotiated settle- 
ment. Weak states with low prestige 
and very limited access to resources, 
on the other hand, are more likely to 
engage in "pure mediation" in which 
they have no power over the outcome. 
Although bringing more incentives, 
rewards, resources and muscle, and 
higher prestige do not guarantee suc- 
cess in negotiations, it improves the 
chances of settlements. This is particu- 
larly true when the parties to the con- 
flict depend on the support of external 
powers for financial and military as- 
sistance, moral support, propaganda 
and recognition. The significance of 
assets, resources, prestige and lever- 
age in mediation also suggests that 
weak, poor and less prestigious re- 
gional and international governmen- 
tal organizations have diminished 
influence in driving the parties to- 
wards negotiated settlements. The Or- 
ganization of African Unity (OAU) is a 
good example of a weak, poor and less 
prestigious regional governmental or- 
ganization that has very little power 
over the outcome of negotiations. Ad- 
mittedly, the ineffectiveness of the 
OAU in mediation is also result of 
other factors: its reluctance to get di- 
rectly involved in internal conflicts 
because the charter of the organization 
prohibits such an action; the willing- 
ness of some member states to con- 
tinue aiding the protagonists with 
propaganda and war supplies; and the 
presence of many major violators of 
human rights, and dictators as heads 
of state. 
In some instances, mediation is sup- 
ported by sanction regimes and force- 
ful actions to ensure compliance. 
Sanction is often intended to serve 
three major policy purposes: send a 
clear message of grave concern to the 
offending sate; punish the state for 
unacceptable behaviour; and indicate 
that stronger measures, including, if 
necessary, the use of force may ,fol- 
low.'* The imposition of sanction on 
Iraq is a good example. Effective sanc- 
tion regimes, however, must be care- 
fully targeted to avoid punishing the 
whole population. The sanction re- 
gime in Iraq is an example of one that 
is poorly targeted and has lost moral 
appeal because it continues to deci- 
mate the population. 
The foregoing suggests that violent 
conflicts are caused by many related 
factors. Resolving violent conflicts, 
therefore, requires a number of coordi- 
nated interventions by many actors. 
Powerful governmental organizations 
such as the World Bank and the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF), for ex- 
ample, should use their powerful 
economic leverage to attach non-vio- 
lent political practice, democratic plu- 
ralism and respect for human rights, as 
conditions for loans and development 
assistance. Such a policy should be 
supported by the industrialized states 
that control these financial institu- 
tions. However, it will also mean that 
some aspects of the Structural Adjust- 
ment Policies (SAPS) that cause ten- 
sions and violence, and undermine 
economic development and social jus- 
tice, should be eliminated.lg 
Collective actions for conflict reso- 
lution will require educational institu- 
tions to offer courses in conflict 
resolution and problem-solving. This 
will also mean reforming the institu- 
tions, designing curriculum and 
adopting teaching techniques that are 
less adversarial, less dictatorial, and 
less discriminatory. Teaching and 
learning peace will involve developing 
a clearer theoretical and practical un- 
derstanding of conflict and conflict 
resolution techniques. 
Non-governmental and govern- 
mental organizations that provide hu- 
manitarian assistance and work with 
refugees and immigrants should be- 
come more actively involved in con- 
flict resolution. This will require the 
organizations to train their employees 
in cross-cultural conflict resolution. 
Those who work for the organizations 
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should also posses good and balanced 
understanding of the people and/or 
societies that they assist. Such knowl- 
edge and training are important be- 
cause those who are being assisted are 
not only victims of conflicts, but also 
carry the very conflicts that uprooted 
them from their homes. 
Reducing the likelihood of violence, 
containing and resolving those that 
emerge, demand idenbfying, creating 
and strengthening local and intema- 
tional institutions and regimes for con- 
flict resolutions, protection of human 
rights, and economic development. 
Also, such goals call for active commit- 
ment, investment and participation of 
governments, the United nations, re- 
gional organizations, religious institu- 
tions, business community, and the 
media in resolving conflicts and elimi- 
nating the root causes of violent con- 
flicts. It is only by engaging actively, 
promptly and collaboratively in 
preventing conflict that the interna- 
tional community will avoid watching 
many more countries being violently 
tom apart, millions of people killed 
and many more violently displaced, 
violence spreading to, and/or desta- 
bilizing peaceful regions20 
This issue of Refuge focuses largely 
on conflict and conflict resolution. The 
sigruficance of strengthening intema- 
tional human rights institutions and 
regimes; the assumptions and roles of 
non-governmental organizations in 
conflict resolution and rebuilding war- 
tom societies; scarcity of resources, 
such as land, and its implications for 
conflict and conflict resolution, are dis- 
cussed. 
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